

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  
EXTRA ORDINARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

W.P (C) 494/2012

IN THE MATTER OF:

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr.

... Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Ors

... Respondent

I N D E X

S.NO.	PARTICULARS	PAGES	C.FEE
1.	Counter affidavit on behalf of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi.	1-50	
2.	The copy of bulletin of information mandated by UIDIA	51-96	
3.	Vakalatnama		

Delhi

Dated :

Filed by :

D.S. Mahra, Advocate  
(Advocate on record)  
Govt. of NCT of Delhi  
Ch.No.123, Central Agency Section,  
Supreme Court Compound,  
New Delhi.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  
EXTRA ORDINARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

IN THE MATTER OF:

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. ... Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Ors ... Respondent

COUNTER AFFIDAVIT ON BEHALF OF  
RESPONDENT/GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI

I, Ashish More, aged about 33 years, Deputy Commissioner, (HQ),  
Department of Revenue, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, do hereby solemnly  
affirm and declare as under:

1. That pursuant to the order dated 26-11-2013 passed by this Hon'ble Court in the bunch of petitions and number of petitions which have come to be filed in various High Courts covered by transfer petition filed in this Hon'ble Court including aforesaid writ petition, the Govt. of NCT of Delhi hereinafter submits its reply as per succeeding paragraphs.
2. That there are some over lapping issues which have been raised in various petitions and the deponent therefore has been advised to deal with issues collectively through this affidavit that arise in those various petitions. For the sake of



clarity, the issues sought to be raised in those petitions are set out below :-

- (i) Whether it was incumbent to create a statutory authority by a law made by Parliament before the implementation of directions for issuance of the Aadhaar cards ?
- (ii) Whether this scheme of issuance of the Aadhar card necessarily infringes the right to privacy of Indian citizens ?
- (iii) Whether the fact that for delivery of some services the Union as well as the States insist upon the production of a Unique Identity is violative of any constitutional rights?
- (iv) Whether the issuance of Unique Identity Numbers to those who may not be citizens of India [illegal migrants] renders the scheme of issuance of the Unique Identity Numbers illegal?

3. That in this context, it is submitted that it is necessary to examine separately, the three distinct issues that underlie these petitions, viz:-

- (A) the functions of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIAI) established by the Government of India,

(B) the scheme for providing a Unique Identity Number [UIN] to each citizen [which would be carried on a card] and

(C) the downstream applications of this Unique Identity Number whereby the delivery of services is being made incumbent upon the possession of a Unique Identification Number.

4. That before addressing the issues on merit, some facts necessary, constituting the UID authority and other relevant backdrop facts may be summarized in the following manner :-

(i) That in year 2006 the government approved the National e-Governance Plan to provide certain services electronically. The union cabinet approved bill under the title The Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2013, which aims to provide access to all central and state government services such as passport, ration card, driving license etc. through electronic mode. A central legislation under the title "The Right of Citizens for time bound delivery of goods and services and redressal of their grievances, Bill" is also pending, which is in sync with the policy of "citizen's charter".

(ii) That the Administrative Reforms Commission in its 12<sup>th</sup> report, titled "Citizen Centric Administration - The Heart of Governance" emphasized on set of commitments regarding the standard of service which a Government Authority delivers and to ensure time bound delivery of the services with suitable compensatory/remedial mechanism in case of default. The biometric identification of the citizen therefore is necessary to cut short the delays in identifying the beneficiaries. Based upon the above said policy, the Govt. of NCT of Delhi has already passed and notified on 07-04-2011 "The Delhi (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services) Act, 2011 (Delhi Act 7 of 2011), by which various citizen related services and deliveries have been time bound. The monitoring of the above said services is IT enabled through e-SLA portal of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. In the absence of biometric identification which rule out possibility of false identification or impersonification, it may be difficult to implement the scheme under the law.

(iii) That Unique Identification Authority of India was constituted and notified by the Planning Commission, Govt. of India on 28-01-2009. The role and responsibilities of the authority was laid down in the said notification. The object of the project, initially

conceived by the Planning Commission, was to empower citizens with biometric identity having attributes of authenticity and integrity.

- (iv) That the parliament enacted the Information Technology Act, 2000 (duly amended in 2008), with an object to provide legal recognition for transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other means of electronic communication and storage of information in digital format. The Act recognized use of electronic records in government and its agencies and give legal recognition of electronic records, its retention, delivery/dispatch of services etc. Hence, biometric identification may be incumbent in some of the essential services rendered by the government to rule out impersonification or fake identification. The said Act deals in general, the security safety of electronic data and offences punishable in case of violation thereof.
- (v) That in so far as the safety, security and management of the electronic data in general, the Delhi Government has already enacted corresponding legislation under the name "The Delhi Geo-Spatial Data Infrastructure (Management Control, Administration, Security and Safety) Act, 2011 (Delhi Act of 06 of 2011). As the very



title suggest, the Act is aimed to maintain security, safety and management/control of the electronic data by the government officials.

SUBMISSIONS ON MERIT :

5. That it is submitted that it is within the executive power of the government and is in fact a duty of the government to keep a record of the residents of a defined areas of the country for a range of reasons from effective economic planning to security, and including delivery of services in a welfare State.
6. That one of the biggest problems encountered by the various welfare schemes run by the government is that of "leakage" and one of the major causes for leakage is the inaccuracy in the data of target beneficiaries.
7. That it is indisputable that effective economic and social planning has to be based on accurate data of the number of people targeted by any programme, including inter alia their economic profiles, their place of residence and other such data relevant for drawing up schemes for effective implementation. Urban poverty alleviation schemes have a different construct from rural poverty alleviation schemes. Unless the residence and other related economic data of the citizens is known, such economic planning is rendered inaccurate and of lesser efficacy – as it has been for the past decades. In the absence of



the resources and technology for accuracy in macro statistics, planning was based upon what was best available. Once the resources and technology are available, it would be a failure of government not to use them to gather accurate data of its citizenry.

8. That this data was earlier gathered either on a sample surveys or by way of a periodic census. The Census involved a similar exercise — it was never condemned as being violative of the right to privacy. Now this process is being supplemented by an accurate system which gives a much higher degree of accuracy in the data. It is something, which is an advancement in governance far from being unconstitutional.
9. That it is obvious that there is no need for any legislation as gathering data in relation to the residents of a country is inherently a part of the executive functions of the government.
10. That another great advantage in current times with the availability of technology, is that a database can be created and the identity of each person can be made electronic which can then serve objectives across the board.
11. That the UIN scheme is thus designed to create an electronic database which can be made available to the planning

agencies so as to improve the delivery quotient of social welfare measures.

12. That however, it bears emphasis that the UIN Scheme does not mandate its use in any defined sphere – that is left entirely to the user agency.

13. That it is not that at present times, no identity is demanded by the various authorities for delivery of services. It is commonly known, that at the lowest level, residents are at times required to produce a "ration card" to prove that they are residents of a particular area, or for other similar purposes. Despite the best endeavours of the government, the accuracy of ration card has never exceeded 50 to 60% – the use of bogus ration cards for obtaining benefits is rampant and destroys a number of welfare schemes by transferring precious resources to the undeserving who manage to abuse the system.

14. There are deliveries of services in States at present which do not require any proof of identity. There is nothing in the UIN scheme which requires any agency of the Union or the States to demand any kind of identity – that is for each individual agency to decide as to for what service they would seek the production of the UIN.

15. That where some identity is required, the UIN [carried on the Aadhaar Card] would in fact furnish across all levels of society and especially to the weaker sections of society, a readily available identity which can be electronically verified and the integrity of which will be higher than any other form of identity which the State can rely upon for verification of identity. The question of such a measure violating any constitutional right does not arise.
16. That with these basic facts, the issues raised in this petition are endeavored to be addressed in the following manner.

NEED FOR A STATUTE—

17. That the Planning Commission has over the years drawn up plans for social welfare and overseen their execution. However, the Planning Commission decided to set up a body which could carry out the job of creating electronic identities for all those who reside in India, as a measure to enable effective planning and effective execution. The creation of an identity database in a country which has a population in excess of a billion is a huge exercise. However, the exercise does not end there and has to be an ongoing exercise since it is equally a challenge to keep the records current by correcting some of the errors which are inevitable in an exercise of this

magnitude, and in updating the records for births and deaths and other changes relevant to each resident.

18. That it is submitted that the Union Government has the executive power to undertake such an exercise – it equally has the power to set up a body to undertake such an exercise. A law is not necessary for the establishment of a body that is carrying on, on behalf of the Government, an activity or a function that the Government could itself carry on in exercise of its executive power.
19. That equally there is no bar in the Government establishing a statutory authority with defined statutory powers and duties for carrying out a governmental function.
20. That the government considered it appropriate to create a Unique Identification Authority of India as a statutory authority for all times, so as to put it in a definite structure and give it statutory powers. The report of the standing committee was received by the Parliament, the Bill was revised by the Union Cabinet and the revised Bill is likely to be presented before the Parliament at an appropriate time. It is however submitted that in the absence of such legislation, there was or is no bar on the government setting up a body to commence the task of compiling a database.



21. That the Bill as is proposed will have various provisions whereby a statutory right will be created in every resident to obtain a UIN. An Authority will be established to be known as the National Identification Authority, the personnel of that authority will be as per the provisions, and most importantly, the tampering with the data in the data repository as well as the misuse of such biometric data will be punishable offences.
22. That obviously, absent such legislation, none of these activities are punishable offences, and if it is desirable that they be treated as offences, a statute became necessary. The converse however does not follow in that there is no illegality in working the UIN scheme just because the violation of or abuse of the scheme would not be a distinct offence under a special statute but will have to be treated as an offence [if any] under the existing laws.
23. That I am advised to state that that there are general provisions in the statutes including the IT Act which deal with tampering with electronic data and unauthorized use of electronic data. Article 21 of the Constitution mandates to protect the privacy of citizens and thereby casts upon the government a duty to protect any information that may have collected by the government to make sure that it is only used for authorised purposes.



24. That apart from this, the kind of information which is being sought is information which in any event can never be confidential. The information sought is:

- a. The name of the resident
- b. The age of the resident
- c. The gender of the resident
- d. The address of the resident

25. That these are the only four mandatory fields. Any other information which is requested in the form is entirely at the option of the resident.

26. That apart from this information, a fingerprint, an iris print and a photograph is sought. There can be no objection to the government keeping a record of the fingerprints of the residents. The Election Commission of India issues identity cards to voters in which all this information is already contained. Every citizen of India, who is beyond the age of 18 is not only entitled but is encouraged as a constitutional duty to obtain a voter's card and then to vote at the elections. All this information which is gathered by the Election Commission is available on their website in the public domain. The Election Commission does not have any statute under which it gathers such information – it does so as a part of its duty under Article 340 to conduct free and fair elections in India.

27. That therefore, as far as the information in relation to every resident is concerned, it is already in public domain by virtue of the exercise conducted by the Election Commission of India. However, unlike the information that is with the Election Commission, the information gathered by the UIAI is kept with the central depository and is not to be made public. The only time this information becomes public is when the resident makes it public by using it or tendering his identity to avail some service or requests the UIAI to release this information to a service provider.
28. That in order to further strengthen this machinery, it may be advisable to have a legislation by Parliament, the details of which were being worked out and a revised Bill is ready for introduction in Parliament. It does not imply that the exercise of identification itself becomes illegal in the meanwhile.

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY—

29. That as already submitted, this challenges raised in the petitions have to be considered in their two dimensions.
- (a) In the first dimension, it relates to the information the resident is obliged to give mandatorily. As already stated, this information is already available from the website of the Election Commission. I submit that to suggest that there is an

invasion of privacy by asking a person to declare his name and gender, it is submitted, is patently untenable.

(b) The second dimension of this is obtaining the biometrics. It is submitted that absent legislation, no citizen can be compelled to give his fingerprint or any other biometric information. The UIAI has no statutory authority to compel to reveal such information. However, at the point of delivery of service, if an identity is necessary and the service provider insists upon a Unique Identity number, it is to the citizen's advantage to furnish such identity. Therefore, the argument that there is a forcible extraction of biometric information is patently untenable. It is submitted that if a citizen does not want a UIN and refuses to give his biometrics, there is no compulsion that is exercised to forcibly extract such information. However, if a service provider insists upon the provision of a UIN, then the legality and validity of that demand, and the consequent refusal to provide the service to a person who lacks a UIN and thereby a verifiable identity would be a matter of the legality of the action of the service provider and not the UIAI.

30. That the real issue, it is submitted, is not an issue of privacy, but whether it is unconstitutional for a government or its agency to insist upon an accurate identity system for delivery of services so as to ensure that there is no leakage of delivery

of such services and the target beneficiaries are properly identified and given the benefit of the services rendered. Ex-facie to suggest that an accurate system of identification of target beneficiaries is unconstitutional is, it is submitted, absurd.

31. That in the earlier days, ration cards were issued without any biometric information but that was for the reason that the equipment to obtain and process biometric information was simply not available.

32. That globally, biometric information is now used for every purpose of identification as it is the only accurate and precise method of excluding abuse of any system of identification. It is therefore submitted that using biometric information for purposes of identity cannot be faulted. This being so, if a citizen considers it sensible to provide biometric information and thereby obtain a Unique Identity number, it can hardly be considered violative of right to privacy. It is submitted that for a host of activities, including some activities covered by fundamental rights, biometric information is demanded and is furnished. A driving license cannot be obtained without biometric information. Passports cannot be obtained without biometric information - right to a passport being a constitutional right.



33. That for telecommunication purposes, it is necessary for a citizen to give not just the data which is sought by the unique identification authority but a lot more. All this data is preserved by private telecommunication companies.
34. That in fact it is submitted that the insistence upon a thumbprint [in addition to a signature] has been in existence for various purposes, the validity of which has never been in issue. The UIN enable each authority or agency, that needs such verification, to verify the data from a central depository with ease. To suggest that such a facility is unconstitutional is it is submitted patently untenable.
35. That for opening a bank account, biometric information is being increasingly used – this is a measure of protection not only of the bank but of the depositor to ensure that his accounts are not violated.
36. That even at immigration points, various countries have increased the use of biometric information to facilitate the movement of passengers. This is generally done by use of an iris imprint.
37. That it is therefore submitted that wherever a citizen wants to avail any service including service which may impinge upon his



constitutional rights, the demand of biometric information is not considered unconstitutional, and infact it is a significant measure of safety of the user as well as a measure of ensuring that the schemes and facilities of benefits are not being abused. It is therefore submitted that to suggest that in today's time, demanding biometric information for making available certain facilities and services is unconstitutional, is, it is submitted, misconceived.

38. That if there is an agency which unreasonably denies the benefit to a target beneficiary by unnecessarily demanding such information, it is that demand which can be constitutionally assailed. The compiling of such data which may be perfectly legitimately required for a host of services, some of which are apparent, is, it is submitted, not a matter which can be challenged as being violative of the right to privacy.
39. That the suggestion that mere biometric information enables the government to track a person is misconceived. The use of mobile phones or other telecommunication equipment infact facilitates the tracking of persons and has been used as a measure even by the investigating authorities for solving crime. No objection has ever been taken to the record of mobile phones or other electronic devices which are equally

important in today's world for convenience being used for this purpose. Therefore, to suggest that on this score any system can be condemned as violative of the right to privacy is misconceived.

40. That however, as far as the UID is concerned, biometric information is stored with the central depository. There is no way the government can use this data to track the movement of a person. It is only where the person uses his biometrics [i.e. by using the UIN] can his movement be tracked using the central data. However the input will have to come from some device where the person volunteers to give his biometric data.
41. That at present, there is no technology which will automatically track every resident and any movement merely because the government possesses the biometric data of such person.
42. That the suggestion therefore that this could become an over invasive technology to the privacy of a resident is misconceived.
43. That incidentally, it may be pointed out that there are other measures and devices which are available to the State already including highly accurate satellites in some countries which can

track individual citizen – none of these have been considered to be in violation of right to privacy.

44. That the suggestion that the use of private agencies to encrypt data compromises the process or makes it liable to misuse, is misconceived. At the outset, it is submitted that no system in the world is failsafe and theoretically any data stored anywhere can be stolen. However, the systems for security of data in current times have improved dramatically whereby in actual practice it is almost impossible to use the data in any form, even if it is stolen if those systems are put in use. The UIAI has put in place the "2048-bit encryption." I am advised to state that even if the encrypted data is taken to the finest agencies in the world, it would take them centuries to decrypt the data.
45. That the UIAI empanels agencies who have the manpower to come and collect the information. However, this information is collected on a laptop which contains software loaded by the UIAI. This software is so designed that the moment the data is recorded, it is automatically encrypted. Even if the agency copies the hard disk, it will not be able to use the data which has come into this hard disk unless the encryption key is available – which encryption key is kept in safety by the UIAI. Every person engaged by such an agency [apart from the

agency itself] is duly enrolled by the UIAI system. Every laptop that is used throughout the country is duly registered and is mapped. In order to collect their payment for the work done, they have to upload the data collected once in 14 days. If they fail to upload, the software will stall the machine and will not record any more data.

46. That I am advised to state that when the data is uploaded and synced, the movement of the laptop automatically gets mapped, for the system is able to tell where the laptop has been and is being used. All this is connected with the other data to ensure that the laptop is not being used by an unauthorised person or for any unauthorized purpose.
47. That I am advised to state that whenever data like this is generated on a computer and transferred etc. in the background it creates a software which in computer terminology is called as "META data". An analysis of the META data parameters can disclose to the trained software operator exactly for what purpose the computer is being used and various other parameters whereby adequate check is kept upon the use of this software. In the circumstances, it is submitted that the suggestion that there has been a compromise with the privacy of citizens by using third party external agencies is misconceived.



48. That in any exercise of gathering identities whether it is by the census authority through the enumerators or through the present process, in theory there is always possibility of leakage. Enumerators can scan and keep copies of all the forms and sell them for a price – this can never be said that the data gathered by enumerator of the census authorities is safe. Far more invasive data in relation to every resident is gathered by the enumerator of the census authority. As against that, the degree of security implementation in gathering data for the Unique Identity number shows that there is no question of violation of any constitutional rights in the process of collection of data and its storage.

#### ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

49. That it is respectfully submitted that the UIAI is a part of the Government of India and is carrying on a job entrusted to it by the planning commission namely, gathering data of residents. It is not a statutory authority in implementing the Citizenship Act or any laws dealing with illegal migration.
50. That the issue whether residents who are illegal migrants should be afforded the benefit of public services is a matter unrelated to the work of the UIAI. The data collected and stored by the UIAI is basic data of the person and the



biometrics. As already stated the use of the data is not prescribed by the UIAI.

51. That thus whether or not a service should be provided to "illegal migrants" pertains to an entirely different issue with which the answering respondent has no concern.
52. That if this Hon'ble Court accepts the case of the petitioner that illegal migrants should not be given any identity number so as to dis-entitle them any facility by the country, this will not impinge upon the work of the UID authority but will impinge upon those who provide those services. It is a decision of a legal and constitutional nature which is not within the scope of this petition. I therefore submit that the legality of the unique identification number scheme cannot be challenged on the ground that there are illegal migrants which are resident in India or that they are being extended the benefit of an identity number which will thereby enable them to obtain benefits and facilities.
53. That it bears repetition that providing benefits and facilities to the migrants is an issue alien to the legality of the present identification number scheme. Therefore, this head of challenge to the unique identification scheme is misconceived.

54. That it is respectfully submitted that the power of the executive are not limited merely to the carrying out of the laws. In a welfare state the function of the executive are widening which cover within their ambit various aspects of social and economic activities. Therefore the executive exercises power to fill gaps by issuing various orders. The executive power of the state is co-terminous with the legislative power. If the legislatures has jurisdiction to make law with respect to a subject, the executive can issue government orders and notifications with respect to it under Article 73/162 of Constitution of India. Such notifications or orders are subject to two limitations (a) such order is in accordance with the express provisions of the constitution and, (b) the legislatures have not enacted any law with respect to the subject.
55. That it is also settled law that the court would not exercise its power of judicial review to interfere with a policy made by the government in exercise of its executive power particularly where it involves technical, scientific or economic issues.
56. That the government is entitled to lay down policy measures and implement its scheme under its executive powers, in order to sub-serve the goal of the constitution i.e. welfare state. As a matter of fact, as per the scheme of the constitution, the

executive powers are the residue powers after excluding the specific and express powers conferred on judiciary and legislature.

57. That the right of privacy enshrined under article 21 of the Constitution of India is not absolute and may be subject to law. The notification/orders issued under article 73 and 162 of the Constitution of India by the Union Government and/or the State respectively are the 'law' made in accordance with the constitution.
58. That the present Writ Petition neither raises any question of Law pertaining to Constitution of India which need interpretation of this Hon'ble Court nor substantiate as to how the issuance of 12 digit Aadhaar Number to the residents of India or the residents of Delhi on a voluntary basis amounts to an invasion of the Right to Privacy guaranteed to the subjects under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the present Writ Petition is not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost.
59. That the present Writ Petition raises a question pertaining to scope and ambit of Article 73 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.R. Raghupathy Vs. State of A.P. (1988) 4 SCC 364 has held that on the perusal of Article

73 and 162 of the Constitution of India, prima facie it appears that the executive powers of Union and States under Article 73 and 162 of the Constitution of India are much wider than the prerogative powers in England. In the interest of the administration of the country, the executive have an important role to play in the governance of the country as the judiciary or legislature. Therefore, this Hon'ble Court including the various High Courts have time and again, while interpreting Article 73 of the Constitution of India, held that where the Constitution does not require an action to be taken only by legislation or there is no existing law to fetter the executive power of the Union (or the State as the case may be), the Government would not only be free to take such action by an Executive Order or to lay down a policy for the making of such Executive Orders as occasion arises, but also to change such orders or the policy itself as often as the Government so requires subject to the condition that, such change must be made in the exercise of a reasonable discretion and not arbitrarily, the making or changing of such order is made known to those concerned and it complies with Article 14, so that persons equally circumstanced are not treated unequally.

60. That, the process of issuing Aadhaar to the people has been followed vigorously in the State of Delhi and it is pertinent to mention here that enrollment of Aadhaar coverage in Delhi



has already touched approx. 1.82 crores and 1.65 crores persons have already been issued Aadhaar. This achievement puts Delhi in a very unique position to roll out any Government service seamlessly on Aadhaar platform.

61. That the issuance of Aadhaar Number is a voluntary project with the main objective is to benefit the members of Society who have no formal proof of identity and faces a lot of difficulties in accessing in many welfare schemes that are implemented by the Government of India and the Delhi Government.
62. That GNCTD has adopted this project so that the benefit of the various schemes implemented by the government can reach the targeted beneficiaries. The enrolment activity in Delhi started on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2010. The GNCTD designated all the Deputy Commissioners (DCs) as Registrars, apart from two other offices, and with a total of 11 Registrars, the empanelled Enrolments Agencies deployed machines and operators to enrol residents under guidance of District Administration/Registrars.
63. That there are many people belonging to vulnerable sections of society who are not getting any benefit of the various welfare schemes of GNCTD for want of proper identity, and GNCTD took extra efforts to identify and provide them an

Aadhaar so that they can also get benefit of the welfare schemes. Special camps were organized for homeless, construction labours, physically challenged and aged people.

64. That as an exercise of proper supervision of the entire enrolment operations, regular review meetings, including at the highest level of Chief Secretary, Divisional Commissioner, and also at the level of the field officers have been taking place and course-corrections are done as and when required. Inspection of enrolment by monitors appointed for this purpose and also by government staff have been a part of the process.
65. That, the GNCTD endeavours to augment the advantages of Aadhaar (UID) which will help in reaching the benefits of various central and State Government Schemes to the actual beneficiaries, thereby, avoiding pilferage of funds on the basis of the measures/schemes already under implementation, and based on the experience so far.
66. That GNCTD launched its social security scheme 'Annshree Yojana' in December 2012, duly budgeted for 2 lakh BPL families without Ration/BPL cards. This Scheme involved Aadhaar based transfer of Rs 600 per month to the Aadhaar linked bank account of the female heads of such families. A total of over one lakh families with Aadhaars have been

registered so far, of which a total of over ninety five thousand beneficiaries have already been paid, including repeat payments, through more than two lakh electronic transactions amounting to over Rupees Eighty Four Crores. The Aadhaar based implementation of the scheme, with complete end-to-end audit and transparent trail, has helped in clean and efficient delivery of social security benefit to the legitimate beneficiaries, eliminating duplicates and leakages, and by greatly minimizing the cost of subsequent repeat benefit delivery. Similar use of Aadhaar in delivering services like pensions, scholarships, subsidized food etc. has the potential to stop-huge leakages and in turn the money saved could be utilized in providing benefits to the more such bonafide beneficiaries.

67. That the application of Aadhaar to the social security benefit schemes is clearly in the larger public interest. Overall, the objective is to clean up delivery system and to ensure that nobody takes away the legitimate rights of the beneficiaries. It is indeed for the protection of the rights of the beneficiaries.
68. That, the impact of the social security benefit schemes would be substantially diluted if Aadhaar is not used as the identity proof (It must be noted that Aadhaar is the only identity that cannot be faked or duplicated). The Government will not only

be forced to continue bearing the burden of duplicate, fake and bogus beneficiaries, but it will also create hindrance in delivering services, which is rigged with inefficiency, non-transparency and delays resulting in denial of rights of the legitimate beneficiaries.

69. That, it would not be out of place to mention here that since Aadhaar number corresponds to a unique record in Aadhaar data base, therefore, tagged to a unique individual, merely introduction of Aadhaar in the beneficiary database ensures detection of a large number of duplicates.

70. That, it is pertinent to mention here that the Revenue Department of GNCTD, vide Order No. F.10(6)/CCS/Div.Com/Hqrs/2736 dated 18.12.12, No. F.10(6)/CCS/DivCom/Hqrs/5130-5131 dated 20.12.2012 decided to use Aadhaar platform for various services rendered by the department and directed to obtain Aadhaar Numbers/Enrolment Numbers in application forms for issue of certificates for SC/ST, OBC, Income, Domicile, Surviving Member, Solvency, Nationality, Birth Order, Death Order, Registration/Solemnization of Marriages, Registration of various documents/deeds etc. at Sub Registrar's Offices etc. Aadhaar enrolment centers were opened at all such points of service delivery in the state, to prevent denial of any of these



services to residents without Aadhaar. Un-enrolled residents could enrol themselves on the spot and submit their applications with Enrolment Numbers.

71. That, it is reiterated that there is no denial of benefits for absence of Aadhaar with a person. GNCTD has been ensuring prompt enrolment of beneficiaries who do not have Aadhaar. The state is also giving adequate time to the beneficiaries for this purpose.
72. That introduction of Aadhaar based welfare schemes have resulted in inclusion of the marginalised sections of the society. Aadhaar has not only provided them identity but help them in getting Bank accounts also.
73. That, it is once again reiterated that the use of Aadhaar is an enabling and empowering tool for the government for better service delivery and for reaching the bonafide beneficiaries, which GNCTD has put to use for its various service delivery initiatives. The experience so far has provided the necessary impetus to the furtherance of such use. It is humbly submitted that there will be no denial of benefits for absence of Aadhaar with a person. The GNCTD will also give adequate time to the beneficiaries for this purpose.

74. That GNCT of Delhi through its systematic and well coordinated approach has almost covered entire population with Aadhaar. This has put Delhi in a very unique position, as compared to other states to deliver government services seamlessly on Aadhaar Platform. Therefore, it is most humbly prayed that Delhi must be allowed to implement one of its most important long term administrative reforms of good governance having attribute of public interest.

SUBMISSION ON TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION  
(AS PER THE INPUT RECEIVED FROM UIDAI)

75. Issue of misplaced assumption and Template aging of Biometric information:

- i. The use of Biometric information which includes 10 Finger Prints and to Iris Scan is based on the recommendation of Biometric Design Standard for UID Applications Report which was headed by Dr. B.K Gairola, Director General of National Informatics Centre, (NIC), Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Amongst the other members were representatives of Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of rural development, Reserve Bank of India. It also had representatives from IIT Bombay IIT Kanpur and technology experts from UIDAI.

- ii. The Committee took into account the international standards and current national recommendations and concluded that the ISO 19794 series of Biometric standard for Finger Prints, face and iris set by the international Standards Organization are the most suitable. These standards are widely accepted, and best embody previous experiences of the US and Europe with biometrics. The standards framed for the UIDAI are accordingly, fully compliant with the respective ISO standards.
- iii. It is not for the first time that Biometric technology is being used in the world for identification system or other applications. One of the major applications of Biometric based identity system is the use of biometrics for passports recommended by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations and which has been in use in more than one hundred countries of the world. 57 countries have been using Biometrics in their e-passports. These countries include Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Italy. United States of America also maintains biometrics of all foreign Airline passengers visiting U.S.A. The use of Biometrics in ID projects is common in the world.

iv. The Committee also viewed the use of Iris Biometric technology as an additional emerging technology to create higher confidence level in the De-duplication process. UIDAI has considered the use of Iris to enhance the de-duplication accuracy. As per UIDAI Data Update Policy Document(version 2.3) which is available on the website of UIDAI, provision for updation of Biometric data exists. Such biometric updates are for the *following stages of the resident's life cycle*:

- *When a child attains and age of five years*
- *When resident attains the age of 15.*
- *Biometric data is recommended to be updated every 10 years.*

v. The UIDAI had also conducted a Proof-of-Concept study during Mar-June 2010 in predominantly rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Bihar and published a report in December 2010 whose key findings included:

- 1) Iris enrollment took less than a minute to capture and could be captured effectively from people, even from those who were blind.
- 2) Children between 4-15 years could be biometrically enrolled correctly, and could be de-duplicated as accurately as adults.



3) The accuracy levels achieved with a combination of fingerprint and iris were more than an order of magnitude (10x) better than using one or the other. The POC report concluded that "The biometric matching analysis of 40,000 people showed that the accuracy levels achieved using both iris and ten fingerprints were more than an order of magnitude better compared to using either of the two individually. Multi-modal enrolment was adequate to carry out de-duplication on a much larger scale, with reasonable expectations of extending it to all residents of India".

vi. As of December 2011, the UIDAI has true and tested statistics computed from real operational large-scale UIDAI system at a gallery size of 8.4 crore (84 million), which is more than 4,000 times the sample size that was available at the time of enrollment POC. There is no longer a need to rely on small sample size tests or hearsay from other projects. (These tests are between 10 to 1,000 times larger than any test conducted on live data in the world.) The UIDAI is now capable of measuring the accuracy, performance and scalability of

the actual production system, which is already among the largest in the world. The analysis resulting from such a large data set is empirically repeatable and statistically accurate. Based on the analysis, it can be said that the enrollment system has proven to be reliable, accurate and scalable to meet the nation's need of providing unique Aadhaar numbers to the entire population. Specifically, the following are observed:

1. Failure to Enroll (FTE) Rate: Zero. As a policy, every unique resident, regardless of their biometrics can be enrolled and issued Aadhaar number.
2. Biometric Failure to Enrol (B-FTE) Rate: 0.14%. This implies that 99.86% of the population can be uniquely identified by the biometric system. The exceptions (0.14%) however can still be de-duplicated using demographic data and checked manually for fraud. The legitimate cases among these will be issued Aadhaar number.
3. False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR): 0.057%. In practical terms, it means that at a run rate of 10 lakh enrolments a day, only about 570 cases need to be manually reviewed daily to ensure that no

resident is erroneously denied an Aadhaar number. Although this number is expected to grow as the database size increases, it is not expected to exceed manageable values even at full enrolment of 120 crores. The UIDAI currently have a manual adjudication team that reviews and resolves such cases.

4. False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR): 0.035%.

This implies that 99.965% of all duplicates submitted to the biometric de-duplication system are correctly caught by the system as duplicates. Given that currently approximately 0.5% of enrolments are duplicate submissions, there would only be a very small number of duplicate Aadhaars issued when the entire country of 120 crores is enrolled.

5. Scalability. The system is currently processing 10 lakhs (1 million) enrolments a day with enrolment database (gallery) of 9.8 crore (98 million). It has scaled (grown) as expected. The additional computing power required to handle increasing number of enrolments will not grow at an

abnormally high (non-linear) rate; it is well within the design and expectations of the UIDAI.

6. The key measures reported above have also been computed at different gallery sizes up to 8.4 crores. Based on the trend, the UIDAI expects the accuracy of the system to remain within the same order of magnitude as reported above. It is now safe to conclude that the system will be able to scale to handle the entire population. The results lay to rest unfounded claims that the underlying technology is untested, unreliable and based on unproven assumptions.
- vii. Impact of biometric sample quality: The same study also studied the impact of biometric sample quality. It is well known from the biometrics scientific literature that quality of biometric samples play an important role in the accuracy of biometric matching. For this reason, it was deemed important to measure and control the quality of biometric data in both the client-side system and the server-side system. The client-side system has checks and balances (for example, automated capture that determines presence of good quality biometric, quality-based re-capture, etc.) that enforces capture of good



quality data from the field. The server-side system aggregates the quality information and analyzes it with respect to different geographic regions, enrollment agencies, individual operators, biometric devices, etc.

The following measurements were obtained:

1. Poor Quality Fingerprints: 2.9% of residents were measured to have poor quality fingerprints as defined by their fingerprints yielding a score of 4 or 5 (on a scale of 1-5) with 5 being the worst quality) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NFIQ fingerprint image quality algorithm. By examining the records with low quality fingerprints, it is observed that majority of people who have poor quality fingerprints actually have good quality irises. It is important to note that for this group of people, the poor quality of their fingerprints alone does not degrade the de-duplication accuracy of the multi-modal system.
2. Poor Quality Fingerprints and Iris: 0.23% of residents have both poor quality fingerprint and poor quality irises. These are the residents who are susceptible to errors from the multi-modal biometric de-duplication system. Therefore, UIDAI team pays significant amount of effort in refining

processes and building checks and balances in the system to measure, control, and reduce poor quality biometric data. It should be noted though that the state-of-the-art Automatic Biometric Identification Systems (ABISs) (such as those procured by UIDAI) are well versed in dealing with poor quality biometric data. Yet, by keenly measuring the quality and continuously improving the process that improves the quality of biometric data, UIDAI is making sure that the quality of collected biometric data stays high and does not degrade. This gives us the confidence that the system will scale to the entire population with the same quality of biometric as measured at the time of writing of this report.

viii. Multi-ABIS Multi-modal Biometric de-duplication the biometric data de-duplication is at the heart of the system. UIDAI has procured 3 ABIS providers to perform biometric de-duplication.

1. The deployment of multiple ABIS improves the accuracy of de-duplication. If any ABIS identifies a potential duplicate, it is sent to the other ABIS for verification. By combining the results of all 3

ABIS's the overall biometric de-duplication accuracy goes up.

2. The utilization of three different de-duplication engines with different implementations and different fusion strategies also helps to detect various kinds of software or data collection errors.

In certain enrolments (for example in suspected duplicates and enrolments with poor quality biometrics) the enrollment data is sent to more than one ABIS to minimize the chance of an identification error.

3. Another fascinating aspect of the continuous improvement process, originates from the feedback that is provided from the server-side system to the enrollment agency about the quality of their data. When enrollment agencies receive frequent report on the quality of their enrolments, it leads them to improve their training and processes – since their payments are linked to successful Aadhaars generated and not number of enrolments conducted. This improvement clearly shows up in measurements

of quality that is performed frequently at the back-end.

4. The three ABISs compete for work based on their throughput capacity. This competition allows for continuous improvement in throughput and accuracy.
5. It ensures that there is no vendor lock-in, if one of the ABIS vendors needs to be replaced (for whatever reason - technical or contractual) it can be done without bringing the entire system to a grinding halt.

ix. Template Aging: Usha Ramanathan, a legal expert and activist, quotes a recent study by Notre Dame University that shows that even a person's iris changes every two years.

1. This was a study of 644 subjects that showed the iris recognition accuracy degraded from 99.9999% (1 in 1 million) to 99.9997% (2.5 in 1 million) over a period of 3 years. The following paper was referenced:

- a. <http://www.nature.com/news/ageing-eyes-hinder-biometric-scans-1.10722#/ref-link-1>



- b. This finding was used to question the assumptions that iris biometrics were susceptible to template aging.
2. The findings of this study have been disproven using a seminal large scale (622,464 subjects over 6 years) iris aging study published by NIST(a government agency of United States of America) in 2013:
- a. [http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs\\_links/iris/irex\\_VI/irex\\_report.pdf](http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/iris/irex_VI/irex_report.pdf).
  - b. The major conclusion of this report are :
    - i. No degradation due to iris template aging
    - ii. Notre Dame result can be explained by dilation of pupil. Easily corrected with no accuracy impact.
  - c. Even if Notre Dame results were accurate, which they are not, the accuracy degradation for UID verification will be so small that it is practically not measurable

- d. In another study on decay in Biometric information is based on the research article authored by Samuel P. Fenker and Kevin W. Bowyer titled 'Experimental Evidence of a Template Aging Effect in Iris Biometrics' which has been referred in one of the Writ Petition (WP 833/2013) had a sample size of 43 subjects.
- x. The biometric enrolment system in Aadhaar has caused India to be recognized the world leader in biometric systems both in terms of volume and accuracy. Many of the innovations from the Aadhaar are being adopted in other countries of the world.
- xi. The above updation policy indicates that UIDAI has not worked on 'misplaced assumption' but has had a well thought out policy to take care of any possible changes in the Biometrics of the residents. The second point that the working conditions, humidity, temperature and lighting conditions also impact the quality of Biometric data (assuming that 'biological materials' stated are Finger-Prints and Iris scan), UIDAI has not experienced any such variation inequality of Biometric data while generating Aadhaar and de-duplicating data for more

than 55 crore residents and at the same time rejected more than 4.5 crore duplicate enrolments which indicates the robustness of the technology.

76. The Aadhaar enrolment form has provision for NPR No. and NPR receipt/ TIN No. wherein resident who have already enrolled in NPR exercise may indicate this number and the convergence of the 2 database.

- i. It is wrong to link use of NPR No./TIN No. to any convergence between UID and NPR.
- ii. The NPR details or TIN is one of the optional fields for enrolment of those residents who enroll for Aadhaar exercise.
- iii. The NPR no /TIN is essentially used in NPR enrolment for linking NPRs digitised database and further enrolment and provides efficiency in the system by expediting the enrolment time. While NPR data is processed by UIDAI for Aadhaar generation, it requires very basic demographic data and biometric data that is required to undertake the de-duplication of identity.
- iv. NPR exercise is mandatory for all residents of India. It is independent of the enrolment under Aadhaar programme. Two aspects of Citizenship Act under

which the NPR exercise is being undertaken needs to be highlighted. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003 has the following provisions on 'Issue of national identity cards' in Section 14A wherein 'The Central Government may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue national identity card to him.' and that (2) The Central Government may maintain a National Register of Indian Citizens and for that purpose establish a National Registration Authority.(etc).

- v. Secondly, the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 specifies the process of maintenance of National Population Register and the process of establishing and maintenance of Local Register of Indian Citizens. As per Section 4 of the above mentioned Rules, for the purposes of preparation and inclusion in the Local Register of Indian Citizens, the particulars collected of every family and individual in the Population Register (i.e. National Population Register or NPR) shall be verified and scrutinized by the Local Registrar, who may be assisted by one or more persons as specified by the Registrar General of Citizen. So the process of drawing up of National Register of Indian Citizens



through a 2-stage programme, for which drawing up of the NPR is the Stage 1.

- vi. The enrolment by UIDAI remains voluntary. There is no convergence of data of UIDAI and NPR at the UIDAI end. The NPR enrolment is merely processed by UIDAI for de-duplication and issuance of an Aadhaar number to the resident. Secondly, UIDAI will transfer the data of those residents who in the course of enrolment with NPR indicate that they have already enrolled for Aadhaar and provide their Aadhaar number to NPR enrolment. UIDAI seeks only the elementary data (e.g. Four demographic fields and biometric data) and not the full set of NPR information and therefore there is no convergence of data at UIDAI point.
- vii. The usage of Aadhaar has grown, either as one of the Proof of identity or proof of address and some agencies have made it mandatory for availing the services/ benefits. The decision to use Aadhaar by various agencies is based on the coverage of population or/and an evidence of versatility and robustness of Aadhaar identity infrastructure like being a de-duplicated identity and on-line authentication capability etc. The adoption of Aadhaar number by NPR

exercise is to be viewed in this context. It is also seen that whenever Aadhaar has been made mandatory by other departments/States Governments these agencies have reiterated that no person should suffer for want of Aadhaar. Also grievance redressal and exception management mechanism has been established and enrolment facilities have been provided for the resident to enroll, e.g LPG case. The adoption and use or seeding of Aadhaar in the various schemes like LPG, Scholarship, pension etc does not mean convergence of these database. These agencies maintain their database and use of Aadhaar as identity system by these agencies is dependent on the beneficiary or the resident.

77. Column 8 of Aadhaar enrolment form on data sharing:

- i. Though the Aadhaar enrolment form has provision for the resident to indicate his consent for data sharing for welfare service agencies, the main methodology of resident using Aadhaar for availing the services and benefits is through the process of resident himself providing his Aadhaar to the agency through the process of 'seeding'. This is how the LPG direct benefit transfer scheme has been functioning for those desirous of

availing the subsidy programme for cooking gas. All other agencies that have plans to use Aadhaar as identity infrastructure have directly sought Aadhaar from the beneficiaries. In brief, no resident will lose the benefit of any future welfare service/benefit just because he did not give his consent for data sharing at the time of enrolment as it is the service provider or welfare agencies who is to determine the methodology of inclusion or any exclusion. It may be relevant to reproduce the Long title of the NIDAI bill which reads as follows:

*"to provide for the establishment of the National Identification Authority of India for the purpose of issuing identification numbers to individuals residing in India and to certain other classes of individuals and manner of authentication of such individuals to facilitate access to benefits and services to such individuals to which they are entitled and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."*


The Long Title clearly indicates that UIDAI is primarily a welfare sector programme with the objective of inclusion as its core philosophy.

- ii. The enrolment form where the consent of residents is taken is a very simple document which is easy to use and understand. It would not be very practical to have detailed guidelines and definitions. The enrolment form may not be the best place to indicate the details of who the welfare agencies are. At the same time it is stated that UIDAI, an attached office of the Planning Commission, Govt of India, has stringent data sharing policy and is alert to the need of data confidentiality and is sensitive to the privacy concerns of the resident.
- iii. In so far as data sharing with the welfare agencies is concerned, it is stated that only the democratic data which consists of four demographic data fields namely (1) Name (2) Age/date of Birth (3) Gender (4) communication address can be shared with Govt agencies only for delivery of welfare services and with Banks for financial inclusion, provided a specific consent to do so is provided by the Resident. Similar information is available with several agencies like EPIC, PAN data etc.
- iv. Further to allay the apprehensions raised on exclusion, it is informed that UIDAI Data Update Policy (Version 2.3) has a provision for update of the consent for data sharing with the welfare agencies. The resident always



have a choice to share or not share his information with the welfare services agencies. In case a resident has not given consent for data sharing at the time of enrolment, he/she can use the update facility for providing 'consent' which will enable them to avail the benefits programme in case this methodology is to be followed.

78. That the answering respondent reserves its right to file detailed affidavit dealing with parawise comments of the writ petition separately, as and when so directed by this Hon'ble or required at any stage of the proceeding.



DEPONENT

VERIFICATION :

Verified by me on this 23 day of Jan 2014 that contents of the aforesaid Counter Affidavit are true and correct to my knowledge so derived from the official records. No part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.



DEPONENT

# Enrolling for Aadhaar

End to End Safe, Secure and fully regulated process

6/12/2013

Unique Identification Authority of India



## Table of Contents

1	UIDAI's Vision and Mission.....	5
2	Constitution of UIDAI & Mandate .....	6
3	Chronology of formation of UIDAI .....	7
4	Executive and Legislative Support of UIDAI .....	8
5	Features of UID .....	9
6	Aadhaar Letter format .....	10
7	UIDAI Data Collection Process Standards .....	11
8	Resident .....	12
9	Registrar .....	13
9.1	Who can be a Registrar .....	13
9.2	How to become a Registrar.....	13
9.3	UIDAI's On-boarding Process for Registrar .....	14
9.3.1.	Setting Up Committees and Joint Working Groups .....	14
9.3.1.1.	Apex Committee and UID Implementation Committee (UIDIC) .....	14
9.3.1.2.	Nodal Department .....	14
9.3.1.3.	Joint Working Group (JWG).....	15
9.3.2.	Sensitization Workshops.....	15
9.3.3.	Enrolment Planning.....	15
9.4	Roles and Responsibilities of a Registrar .....	15
10	Enrolment Agency.....	16
10.1	Who can be an Enrolment Agency.....	16
10.2	How to Become an Enrolment Agency .....	16
10.3	On-Boarding Process for Enrolment Agency (EA) .....	17
10.4	Roles and Responsibilities of Enrolment Agency .....	17
11	UIDAI's Controls on Registrar and Enrolment Agency .....	18
11.1	Linkage between UIDAI, Registrar and Enrolment Agency.....	18
11.1.1.	MoU between UIDAI and Registrar.....	18
11.1.2.	Empanelment of Enrolment Agencies by UIDAI .....	19
11.1.3.	Contract between Registrar and Enrolment Agency .....	19



12	Introducers.....	20
12.1	Who can be an Introducer .....	20
12.2	How does one become an Introducer.....	20
12.3	On-boarding of Introducers .....	21
12.4	Roles and Responsibilities of an Introducer.....	21
12.5	UIDAI's control on Introducers .....	22
13	Verifiers.....	23
13.1	Who can be a Verifier.....	23
13.2	How to become a Verifier .....	23
13.3	On-Boarding of Verifiers .....	23
13.4	Roles and Responsibilities of a Verifier .....	23
13.5	UIDAI's control on Verifiers.....	24
14	Operators .....	25
14.1	Who can be an Operator.....	25
14.2	How does one become an Operator.....	25
14.3	On-Boarding of Operators.....	26
14.4	Roles and Responsibilities of an Operator .....	26
14.5	UIDAI's control on Operators.....	27
15	Supervisor .....	28
15.1	Who can be an Supervisors.....	28
15.2	How does one become a Supervisor.....	28
15.3	On-Boarding of Supervisors .....	28
15.4	Roles and Responsibilities of Supervisors .....	29
15.5	UIDAI's control on Supervisors .....	29
16	Training and Certification Provisions by UIDAI .....	31
17	Enrolment Centers .....	32
18	Enrolment Machine.....	33
18.1	Device Certification .....	33
19	Enrolment Process .....	35
19.1	Enrolment Process and Encryption .....	35
19.2	Packet Upload .....	36
20	Letter Print and Delivery .....	37



21	Contact Center .....	38
22	Monitoring Mechanism.....	39
22.1	Enrolment Centers Monitoring .....	39
22.2	Quality Checks.....	39
22.3	Biometric De-duplication to establish uniqueness of resident.....	40
23	Document Management System .....	42
24	UIDAI List of IT Tools and Portals .....	43
24.1	UIDAI Website .....	43
24.2	Aadhaar Admin Portal.....	43
24.3	EA Performance Monitoring Portal.....	44
24.4	Operator/Supervisor Certification Portal.....	44
24.5	Aadhaar SFTP Client for packet Upload .....	44
25	Data Center Security .....	45
26	Aadhaar Enrolment Fact Sheet .....	46

## 1 UIDAI's Vision and Mission

UIDAI's vision is to empower residents of India with a unique identity and a digital platform to authenticate anytime, anywhere.

UIDAI's Mission statement is as follows:

- Deliver Aadhaar numbers to over 60 Cr residents by 2014 with a well-defined turnaround time and adhering to stringent quality metrics
- Collaborate with partners to setup infrastructure which provides convenience to residents for updating and authenticating their digital identity
- Collaborate with partners and service providers in leveraging Aadhaar to serve residents effectively, efficiently and equitably
- Encourage innovation and provide a platform for public and private agencies to develop Aadhaar linked applications
- Ensure availability, scalability and resilience of the technology infrastructure
- Build a long term sustainable organization to carry forward the vision and values of the UIDAI
- Make it attractive for the best global expertise in different fields to collaborate and provide valuable insights to the UIDAI organization.

## 2 Constitution of UIDAI & Mandate

Government of India notification dated 28.1.2009 constituted UIDAI as an attached office with the following mandate:

- Generate and assign UID to residents.
- Define mechanisms and processes for interlinking UID with partner databases on a continuous basis.
- Frame policies and administrative procedures related to updation mechanism and maintenance of UID database on an ongoing basis.
- Co-ordinate / liaise with implementation partners and user agencies as also define conflict resolution mechanism.
- Define usage and applicability of UID for delivery of various services.
- Operate and manage all stages of UID lifecycle.
- Adopt Phased approach for implementation of UID specially with reference to approved timelines.
- Take necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per approved strategy)
- Ensure ways for leveraging field level institutions appropriately such as PRIs in establishing linkages across partner agencies as well as its validation while cross linking with other designated agencies.
- Evolve strategy for awareness and communication of UID and its usage
- Identify new partner / user agencies
- Issue necessary instructions to agencies that undertake creation of databases, to ensure standardization of data elements that are collected and digitized and enable collation and correlation with UID and its partner databases.
- Frame policies and administrative procedures related to hiring / retention / mobilization of resources, outsourcing of various tasks and budgeting & planning for UIDAI and all State units under UIDAI.

The purpose of the Scheme is to ensure better delivery of government services.

### 3 Chronology of formation of UIDAI

Date	Event
Year 2000	Group of Ministers (GoM) constituted for deliberating on Multi-purpose National Identity Card.
07-01-2004	Citizenship Rules amended – concept of a 2-step process of Population Register and Citizenship Register introduced (Rule 4 (3) and Rule 4(4)).
03-Mar-2006	Administrative Approval for the Project “Unique ID for BPL Families”.
03-Jul-2006	Setting up of a Process Committee to suggest the process for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data and fields from the Core Database to be created under the Unique ID for Below Poverty Line Families (BPL) Project.
04-Dec-2006	Constitution of Empowered Group of Ministers (eGoM) to collate two schemes : The National Population Register under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Project of the Department of Information Technology.
28-Jan-2009	Unique Identification Authority of India was constituted and notified by the Planning Commission as an attached office.
29-Sep-2009	Constitution of the Biometrics Standards Committee to frame biometrics standards for use by the UIDAI.
30-Jul-2009	Constitution of Prime Minister’s Council of UID Authority of India.
09-Oct-2009	Constitution of the Demographic Data Standards and Verification Procedure Committee (DDSVPC) to review the existing standards and modify/ enhance/ extend them.
09-Dec-2009	Submission of the Final Report of the Demographic Data Standards and Verification Procedure Committee (DDSVPC).
17-Jan-2010	Submission of the Final Report of the Biometrics Standards Committee.
Mar-2010	Proof-of-Concept (PoC) study of biometric enrolment from March 2010 to June 2010 in the predominantly rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Bihar.
03-12-2010	Introduction of the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 in the Rajya Sabha.
13-12-2011	Report of the Standing Committee on Finance submitted.
08-10-2013	Approval of the Cabinet on the Observations of UIDAI on the Standing Committee Report and for Official Amendments to the NIDAI Bill, 2010.



#### 4 Executive and Legislative Support of UIDAI

- UIDAI was set up by an executive order by virtue of the powers under Article 73 of the Constitution of India as an "attached office" of the Planning Commission of India vide notification dated 28th January, 2009
- The Prime Ministers Council on UID Authority of India was set up on 30th July, 2009 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister to, inter alia, give advice to UIDAI on the Program, methodology and implementation to ensure coordination between Ministries/Departments, stake-holders and partners.
- A Cabinet Committee on UIDAI headed by the Prime Minister was constituted on 22nd October, 2009 to cover all issues relating to the Unique Identification Authority of India including its organization, plans, policies, programmes, schemes, funding and methodology to be adopted for achieving the objectives of that Authority.
- Information Technology Act, 2000 and Rules frames there under, defines what constitutes Sensitive Personal Data, and also provides statutory safeguards in the form of aforesaid Rules and imposes penalties in terms of compensation and/or imprisonment terms for violating provisions of law .
- The Scheme has the approval of the Union Cabinet and its funding requirements are being met every year with the approval of the Parliament under the Appropriations Act.

## 5 Features of UID


- Aadhaar is a 12 digit, system generated, random number with no intelligence built into the number.
- One resident can get only one Aadhaar and no two residents can get the same Aadhaar number. The biometric attributes collected during Aadhaar enrolment ensure uniqueness.
- All residents including children can get Aadhaar.
- Enrolment for Aadhaar is voluntary.
- Aadhaar does not guarantee any Entitlements or Rights of Citizenship.
- Aadhaar has an Introducer system for inclusion of those without any existing identity documents. A problem in reaching benefits to poor and marginalized residents is that they often lack the identification documents they need to receive State benefits. The 'Introducer' system, which has been approved for data verification for the UIDAI, will enable such residents to establish an identity.
- Aadhaar is a universal number, and agencies and services can contact the central Unique Identification database from anywhere in the country to confirm a beneficiary's identity.
- Aadhaar-based authentication confirms entitlement is delivered to the intended beneficiary.

## 6 Aadhaar Letter format

## 7 UIDAI Data Collection Process Standards

- The UIDAI's data collection process consists of resident's demographic and biometric data collection.
- PM's council of UID Authority of India held on 12<sup>th</sup> of August, 2009, had approved that UID would assign unique numbers to each resident of India which will be based on his/her basic demographic details and biometrics.
- The Demographic Data Standards used during enrolment process are prescribed by a **Demographic Standards Committee** consisting of Govt. of India officials from various Ministries, Reserve Bank of India, Indian Institute of Management and UIDAI. This Committee laid down the demographic standards to be adopted by UIDAI during resident enrolment.
- The Committee Recommended collection of Name, Address, Gender and Date of Birth as mandatory fields.
- Biometrics Committee with members from Govt. of India, Reserve Bank of India, Indian Institute of Technology, UIDAI etc. as members decided on the biometrics data format.
- In a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Unique Identification Authority of India related issues dated 18<sup>th</sup> May, 2010 accorded in principle approval for inclusion of Iris as a biometric parameter.
- The various components in the end to end resident Aadhaar enrolment process will be discussed in this document.

UIDAI Enrolment Process Components





## 8 Resident

UIDAI has been setup by the Govt. of India with a mandate to issue a unique identification number to all the residents in the country.

Definition of resident has been taken from the definition of "Population Register" as given in Rule 2(l) of the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 which have been framed under the Citizenship Act, 1955. Rule 2 (l) defines "Population Register" to mean the register containing details of persons usually residing in a village or rural area or town or ward or demarcated area (demarcated by the Registrar General of Citizen Registration) within a ward in a town or urban area.

Aadhaar does not guarantee any rights of citizenship to the resident.


## 9 Registrar

"Registrar" is any entity authorized or recognized by the UID Authority for the purpose of enrolling the individuals for UID numbers.

### 9.1 Who can be a Registrar

- Registrars are Departments or Agencies of the Central Government/ State Government/Union territory.
- Public Sector Undertaking can also be UIDAI's Registrars.
- Other agencies and organizations, which, in normal course of implementation of some of their programs or activities or operations interact with Residents. Examples of such Registrars are :
  - i. Rural Development Department.
  - ii. Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department.
  - iii. Public Sector Undertakings
- UIDAI has partnered with these agencies leveraging their existing infrastructure in order to implement the UID project.

### 9.2 How to become a Registrar




- UIDAI identifies the Registrar.
- Registrar must sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UIDAI to adhere to the UIDAI prescribed standards, procedures and processes.

### 9.3 UIDAI's On-boarding Process for Registrar

There is a detailed on-boarding process for Registrars which consists of below broadly categorized activities:

- Set up Committees and Joint Working Groups.
- Conduct Sensitization Workshops.
- Conduct Enrolment Planning.

#### 9.3.1. Setting Up Committees and Joint Working Groups



##### 9.3.1.1. Apex Committee and UID Implementation Committee (UIDIC)

An Apex/empowered committee headed by Chief Minister and Implementation Committee (UIDIC) headed by Chief Secretary is setup. Any Non-State Registrar (NSR) desirous of undertaking enrolments in a particular State also needs to be co-opted in the Implementation Committee by the UIDAI Regional Office.

##### 9.3.1.2. Nodal Department

UIDIC decides the State Department that will be acting as the Nodal Department for Aadhaar Enrolments in State which will act as Registrar and assign a nodal Officer.

#### 9.3.1.3. Joint Working Group (JWG)

A Joint Working Group headed by the Head of the Nodal Department/Registrar is setup. The other members in JWG are the Nodal Officers & members who can lead the Technology and various Process teams from the Registrar's side. UIDAI nominates appropriate representatives to assist the State Government/Registrars in carrying through the entire process.

#### 9.3.2. Sensitization Workshops

- A series of sensitization workshops are held to provide an overview of Aadhaar, enrolment and IEC approach, roles and responsibilities at State/District/ Village levels, enrolment strategy and plans.
- Sub-group workshops and meetings are held with the members of the process, technology, communications and applications teams respectively to identify the key areas of integration and implement the same.
- UIDAI ensures that Registrar's technology, process & publicity aspects are aligned with UIDAI.
- A "Go Live readiness Workshop" is scheduled 2-3 weeks before scheduled 'go-live' date to take stock of the implementation status on items required to start enrolments.

#### 9.3.3. Enrolment Planning

- Finalize the targeted enrolment numbers, locations to be covered and timelines for the same.
- Enrolment Agency Selection and On-boarding.
- Identify Introducers, Verifiers and other stakeholders and complete their on-boarding.
- Enrolment Centre and Stations Requirement planning and identification of locations.
- Non-state registrars should work in coordination with UIDAI and state nodal departments.

### 9.4 Roles and Responsibilities of a Registrar

A high level summary of various roles and responsibilities of Registrar are:

- As a part of the **Enrolment Planning**, the Registrar finalizes the targeted enrolment numbers, locations to be covered and timelines for the same, enrolment approach (phased, sweep etc).
- Registrars **engage Enrolment Agencies** for the purpose of enrolling resident into Aadhaar. Registrars share the details of hired Enrolment Agencies with UIDAI.
- Registrar **identifies locations for Enrolment Centers** and works out the number of machines required in coordination with the enrolment agencies. The number of machines can be decided based on the target number of days for completion of enrolment in the particular area or the district and the expected number of enrollees in the area.
- Registrar notifies and deploys **Introducers and Verifiers** in Enrolment Centers.
- Registrar takes care of **Education and Communication** activities in their region as per UIDAI guidelines and the recommended messages and media to use.
- Registrar puts a **monitoring** as well as **grievance redressal** mechanism for resident complaints in place.



## 10 Enrolment Agency


Enrolment Agencies are entities hired by the Registrars for undertaking demographic and biometric data collection for UID enrolment. Enrolment Agencies must ensure continued empanelment by UIDAI in order to be engaged by Registrars. If non-empanelled agencies are engaged by Registrars, they are also subject to the same terms and conditions as the empanelled agencies.

### 10.1 Who can be an Enrolment Agency

- A Single company/ organization (e.g. Govt./ Semi-Govt./ Private/ PSU/ NGO/ Not-for-Profit/ Microfinance Institution) or Consortium of companies/ organizations (maximum of 4 members) registered in India and in existence for at least three (3) years at the time of empanelment, are eligible to submit proposals for empanelment for the project.
- The applicant (single agency/ all consortium members) must be incorporated or registered in India under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (including Section – 25 of the Act)/ Partnership Act, 1932 / Societies Registration Act 1860/ the Indian Trusts Act 1882/ it's equivalent in the respective States OR must be Proprietorship entities having a PAN number.
- Agency must have an average Net Worth or Annual Turnover/Grants-in-Aid (in case of Not for Profit organizations) of at least INR 50 lakhs.
- The applicant, except NGOs and Not for-profit organisations, should have reported profits, in at least 2 (two) of the past 3 (three) Financial years as declared by audited account / certified balance sheet of financial statement reported in India.
- The applicant (single agency/ consortium members) should not have been blacklisted by Central, or any State/ UT Government. The applicant (single agency/ consortium members) shall not be under a declaration of ineligibility for corrupt financial practices.
- Sub-Contracting of Enrolment Work is not allowed for private/ commercial Organizations /PSUs /Govt. Companies /Autonomous bodies.

### 10.2 How to Become an Enrolment Agency

- UIDAI conducts an annual empanelment exercise by releasing a Request for Empanelment (RFE).
- The applicants must meet the eligibility criteria in RFE to be empanelled as an Enrolment Agency.
- Registrar calls for Quotes from empanelled agencies and selects agency/s for Enrolment Work.
- Registrar may also appoint a non-empanelled agency who fulfills the same eligibility criteria as an empanelled agency.



### 10.3 On-Boarding Process for Enrolment Agency (EA)

UIDAI has detailed guidelines, processes and systems in place for on-boarding of Enrolment Agencies. The steps include:

- First and foremost the Agency's Project and Technology Manager is added to Joint Working Group consisting of Registrar and UIDAI representatives.
- Enrolment Agency on-boarding workshop is conducted by Registrar as well as UIDAI.
- EA is assigned a code by UIDAI and this code is part of the information in every enrolment packet.
- EA then procures logistics and manpower as per the Registrar contract requirements.
- EA sets up centers in locations identified by the Registrar and uploads information of each active center on UIDAI's website. This information includes Contact Person information for each center.


### 10.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Enrolment Agency

Enrolment Agency's primary roles and responsibilities are:

- Procure enrolment hardware, software including biometric devices as per UIDAI specifications.
- Hire & Train manpower like Operator, Supervisor and other technical staff for Enrolment activities.
- Get Operators and Supervisors certified, enrolled in Aadhaar and register them at UIDAI.
- Install and Register Aadhaar Enrolment Software as per UIDAI guidelines.
- Setup Enrolment Centers and capture Resident's demographic and biometric information for Aadhaar enrolment as per UIDAI's process guidelines.
- Upload Enrolment Packets to UIDAI as per guidelines for data upload. The EA must export and upload data at the most within 20 days of enrolment. The client will freeze if packet pending for uploads exceed 1000 numbers on the station.
- Synch enrolment machine, with the server every 10 days, mandatorily.
- The Enrolment Agencies are expected to keep the hard copies of proof documents, consent and enrolment forms from the residents indexed and stored in such a way that they are retrievable, accessible and safeguarded against environmental damage till the time they are submitted to UIDAI's document management service provider.

## 11 UIDAI's Controls on Registrar and Enrolment Agency

### 11.1 Linkage between UIDAI, Registrar and Enrolment Agency



#### 11.1.1: MoU between UIDAI and Registrar

- UIDAI signs MoU with the Registrars to set out the general and broad-based intentions of both Parties for collaboration and as an umbrella understanding for facilitation of subsequent agreements and documents relevant for the implementation of the UID project in the State.
- The UIDAI prescribes standards, procedures and processes which are to be adhered to by the Registrars identified / appointed by the State Government/Union territory.
- All Registrars are issued a 3 digit unique code by UIDAI and they are registered in UIDAI database. All enrolments can be traced back to a unique Registrar.
- To address the problem of data / process errors in the Aadhaar enrolments UIDAI imposed financial penalty for data or process errors in the new phase of enrolments commencing from April 2012.
- UIDAI generates a report on errors on monthly basis.
- The source of the error-reporting can be QA process, report of the performance monitors, reports of the third party auditors, Contact centre reports, complaint by the residence, fraud detection mechanism in UIDAI, or any other sources.
- Errors will be taken for penalty irrespective of the stage of processing of the enrolment packets.
- Since UIDAI does not make any direct payment to the enrolment agency the penalty amounts are recovered from the payments due to the Registrars as financial assistance for successful Aadhaar generation.
- Registrars in turn, insert suitable penal clauses in their contract/ agreement with Enrolment agencies.



#### 11.1.2. Empanelment of Enrolment Agencies by UIDAI

- UIDAI empanels Enrolment Agencies through an yearly RFE (Request for Empanelment) process.
- The enrolments are done by the Enrolment Agency on behalf of the Registrars/Sub-Registrars but strictly in adherence to the processes, guidelines, instructions and software issued by UIDAI.
- The Registrar may use either the services of the empanelled agencies. Even if Registrar uses a non-empanelled agency, the agency must sign the same Terms and Conditions with UIDAI as an empanelled agency.
- UIDAI assigns a 4 digit unique code to EAs and all EAs are linked to one or more Registrar in UIDAI's database. All enrolments can be traced to the respective EA- Registrar combination.
- All Enrolment Agencies are required to furnish an unconditional and irrevocable Bank Guarantee equivalent to INR 200000/- from a scheduled commercial bank in India valid for the entire period of empanelment which can be invoked in case of breach/default of the Terms and Conditions of the said Empanelment, and non-compliance with directions to rectify in given time frame.
- The RFE has provisions for withdrawal and termination of Empanelment of Enrolment Agencies.
- UIDAI monitors data quality of Enrolment Agencies and provides regular feedback to Registrar and EAs.  
Penalties are deducted based on Data Quality and Process Errors.
- UIDAI conducts Weekly meeting for EA issues every Wednesday, with all Regional Offices, EAs and Technology Team of UIDAI.
- UIDAI has empanelled Monitors for Enrolment Center Monitoring. These Monitors are trained extensively for UIDAI process and technology guidelines that need to be monitored at the center. UIDAI has provided a template for the parameters to be monitored and software to upload all findings at the center.

#### 11.1.3. Contract between Registrar and Enrolment Agency

- Registrar issues a tender to contract one or more Enrolment Agency/s for Aadhaar Enrolments in their region. The Registrar Contract separately lists the Terms and Conditions and Service Level Agreements for the Enrolment Agency.
- Since UIDAI does not make any direct payment to the enrolment agency the penalty amounts are recovered from the payments due to the Registrars as financial assistance for successful Aadhaar generation.
- Registrars in turn, insert suitable penal clauses in their contract/ agreement with Enrolment agencies.




## 12 Introducers

### 12.1 Who can be an Introducer

- Must be above the age of 18 years and must not have a criminal record.
- Can be
  - i. Registrars own employees
  - ii. Elected local body members
  - iii. Members of local administrative bodies
  - iv. Postmen
  - v. Influencers such as teachers, health workers & doctors, Aanganwadi / ASHA workers
  - vi. Representative of local NGO's etc.

### 12.2 How does one become an Introducer

- Must be **Notified by Registrars**. No individual can become an Introducer without Registrar's permission.
- **Must have an Aadhaar Number**.
- Must be **Registered in UIDAI** as an "Introducer" by a Registrar. Thus UIDAI has prior knowledge of a valid Introducer and the source of this information is the UIDAI's Registrar.




### 12.3 On-boarding of Introducers

- UIDAI facilitates Registrar in conducting Training Workshop for Introducers. Elaborate Training content is provided by UIDAI.
- They are enrolled and their Aadhaar numbers generated before they can start working as an Introducer in the field.
- Introducers **must provide a written consent** to the Registrar to work as an Introducer and abide by the guidelines and procedures laid down for the Introducers.
- Introducer's Liabilities are clearly defined against collusion to provide false information or impersonation. Any false verification by Introducer shall make him liable for legal action.
- Format of consent provided by Introducer is shown below.

### 12.4 Roles and Responsibilities of an Introducer

- Introducer confirms the identity and address of the resident they are introducing.
- Introducer must only introduce residents who do not have documentary proof of identity or address. Introducer is not obliged to introduce every person who approaches them
- The Introducers must check the Resident's Name and Address on the enrolment form for correctness and completeness. Introducer should also check his/her own details in the form and then provide his/her signature/thumbprint on the Enrolment Form space provided.
- Introducer must carefully check the Name and Address details of the Resident and provide their Approval/Rejection.
- Introducer has to provide their biometric on Aadhaar client to endorse a resident's enrolment.
- The Introducer also signs/provide thumbprint on the consent for enrolment.
- Introducers must keep themselves informed on the Enrolment Schedules, Enrolment Centre locations and operational hours of the Enrolment Centers in their assigned territory.
- Introducer cannot charge fees for introducing residents.
- Introducer must not collude with a person to impersonate another person (dead or alive) at the time of enrolment.
- Introducer must not help an Aadhaar holder to deliberately take on the identity of another person by changing their demographic information or even collude to provide false biometric information.

## 12.5 UIDAI's control on Introducers



- Introducer can only introduce people within the **limited administrative boundaries** defined by the Registrar (State, district level). These boundaries are recorded by the Registrar themselves in UIDAI.
- Introducer's Name and Aadhaar Number is recorded against every enrolment where they introduce the resident. This is recorded on the Aadhaar Enrolment Form as well as on the Enrolment Software.
- Introducer has to **Sign Off** enrolment at three levels.
  - i. Introducer Signs on the Enrolment Form of every Resident who is being introduced by the Introducer.
  - ii. Introducer Provides Biometric Sign off on the enrolment software against every resident's enrolment that he/she is introducing.
  - iii. Introducer signs off on the Consent copy printed at the end of the Aadhaar enrolment of the resident that he/she has introduced.
- Aadhaar Software has the capability to identify and reject any packet that has Unauthorized Introduction (i.e. by an Invalid Introducer). This check is a part of the system design for packet processing.


## 13 Verifiers

### 13.1 Who can be a Verifier

- Any **serving /retired official** both from Government (including Armed forces and Central Paramilitary Forces) and Public Sector Undertakings including Banks **not below the rank of Group 'C'/ class III employees**.
- In the areas, like big cities and Metros, where registrar is unable to avail the services of such Retired/Serving government officials, services of an outsourced vendor can be availed of to provide verifiers with the approval from UIDAI Regional Office.
- The verifiers in an enrolment centre cannot be from the same vendor, hired as enrolment agency.

### 13.2 How to become a Verifier

- Verifiers are appointed by Registrar. No individual can become a Verifier without Registrar's permission.



### 13.3 On-Boarding of Verifiers

- Verifiers are appropriately trained before being assigned in the field for Aadhaar Enrolments.
- Verifier's responsibility is clearly defined as to ensure that Enrolment form is filled completely and correctly and matches the information in the resident's proof documents and that the documents are valid as per the approved list of documents.
- UIDAI has defined guidelines for verification of documents that are shared with the Registrar.


### 13.4 Roles and Responsibilities of a Verifier

- Verifier must **verify Photocopy of Documents** and Enrolment Form details against original documents, as per the UIDAI Guidelines for Verification.



- It is verifier's responsibility to ensure that Enrolment form is filled completely and correctly as per UIDAI enrolment process.
- Verifier must ensure that the proof documents are valid as per UIDAI.
- Verifier will **sign and stamp** the Enrolment Form after verification.
- Verifier needs to be available in the enrolment center throughout the operating hours of the center.

### 13.5 UIDAI's control on Verifiers



- The list of all Verifiers must be notified, by designation, by the Registrar before commencement of the enrolments and the list should be shared with the UIDAI's Regional office concerned.
- Verifier signs off every Enrolment Form that he/she verifies with respect to the Resident Documents. The Enrolment Form and document copies are available at UIDAI's Document Management System.


## 14 Operators

### 14.1 Who can be an Operator

- The person should be of age 18 years and above.
- The person shall be minimum 10+2 pass.
- The person should have a basic understanding of operating a computer and should be comfortable with local language keyboard and transliteration.

### 14.2 How does one become an Operator

- Should have undergone training on the process of UID Enrolment and various equipment and devices used during Aadhaar enrolment.
- Must have been **Certified** from a testing and certifying agency authorized by UIDAI.
- Must have his/her Aadhaar number generated.
- The person must be **employed** by a valid Enrolment Agency.
- **Registered** as an Operator in UIDAI database by an enrolment agency.




#### 14.3 On-Boarding of Operators

- UIDAI has empanelled 14 Training Agencies that can be utilized by Enrolment Agencies for training of Manpower.
- **Certification of Operators in Aadhaar Processes is a must. Certification of Operators is to be done by any of the two Testing and Certification Agencies that UIDAI has authorized namely, NSEiT and Sify.**
- Aadhaar Enrolment and Aadhaar number generation is mandatory.
- **Registration in Aadhaar Database as an Operator for a valid Enrolment Agency is a must.**
- **Biometric Authentication of the Operator is done on the machine where Operator will work. Operator cannot use a machine they are not authorized on.**
- The Registered list of operators (as well as Supervisor & Introducer) that can be on-boarded on an enrolment machine is also provided by UIDAI server in the form of a master data file. This master file lists all valid Operators (Certified, Aadhaar generated and finally Registered by the enrolment agency).
- Unregistered users cannot be on-boarded on an enrolment machine. Operator/Supervisor and Introducer to be on-boarded on the machine provide their fingerprints. Once Biometrics are captured, a request is sent to UIDAI server for authentication. During authentication at server, biometric of the Operator/Supervisor and Introducer are compared against the biometric provided by same user at the time of enrolment.
- A successful authentication is a must for enrollers to login and work on that machine for Aadhaar Enrolment.

#### 14.4 Roles and Responsibilities of an Operator

- Operator must enrol only a verified resident. Thus, first of all, operator must check that the resident's enrolment form is verified and carries Verifier's/ Introducer's signature/thumb print. The form must also carry Resident's (Applicant's) signature/thumbprint.
- Operator must make sure from the photo on documents that they belong to the same resident whose enrolment is to be done.
- Operator captures demographic and biometric data of the resident in the Aadhaar client software. The Operator must ensure to follow the sequence of data capture as per the screens provided on the software client.
- Review demographic data with resident and provide biometric sign off.
- Print, sign and provide acknowledgement to the resident and take resident's signature on consent at the end of enrolment.

#### 14.5 UIDAI's control on Operators



- Operators are biometrically authenticated on the computer in which they will conduct enrolment of residents.
- The Aadhaar Enrolment Software does not allow an unauthorized operator to login to the software as explained in the above section of on-boarding of Operators.
- Operator provides biometrics on every resident packet that s/he enrolls. Every time Operator's biometrics are matched with the locally stored biometrics of authorized operator. Local verification status and error generated by software is depicted in below table.

Entity	Status	Permission for enrolment	Error/Warning
Operator	Not an authorized Operator on the machine	No	Cannot login to the client
Operator	Authorized	Yes	

- An enrolment packet will be rejected if the Operator's Biometrics in the packet does not match the authorized operator's biometrics.
- The data quality of enrolment by an Operator is continuously evaluated at UIDAI's back end. UIDAI has awarded as well as blacklisted operators based on Performance Monitoring.




## 15 Supervisor

### 15.1 Who can be an Supervisors

- The person should be of age 18 years and above.
- The person shall be 10+2 pass and should preferably be a graduate
- The person should have a good understanding and experience of using a computer
- The person should preferably have prior experience of working in Aadhaar Enrolment program

### 15.2 How does one become a Supervisor

- Should have undergone training on the process of UID Enrolment and various equipment and devices used during Aadhaar enrolment.
- Must have been **Certified** from a testing and certifying agency authorized by UIDAI.
- Must have his/her Aadhaar number generated.
- The person must be **employed by a valid Enrolment Agency**.
- **Registered** as a Supervisor in UIDAI database.



### 15.3 On-Boarding of Supervisors


- Certification of Supervisors in Aadhaar Processes is a must. UIDAI has empanelled 14 Training Agencies that can be utilized by Enrolment Agencies for training of Manpower.
- Certification of Supervisors is to be done by any of the two Testing and Certification Agencies that UIDAI has authorized namely, NSEiT and Sify.
- Aadhaar Enrolment and Aadhaar number generation is mandatory.

- Registration in Aadhaar Database as a valid Supervisor for a valid Enrolment Agency is a must.
- Biometric Authentication of the Supervisor is done on the machine where Supervisor will work. Supervisor cannot use a machine they are not authorized for. This is similar to the process explained for operators in above section.

#### 15.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Supervisors

- Supervisor's role is to plan and deploy logistics and other requirements at the enrolment centre, and setup the enrolment machines at the enrolment centre.
- Supervisor provides biometric sign off for residents who have been enrolled with a biometric exception (for example a finger/iris missing).
- Manage and Supervise the operations at the centre.

#### 15.5 UIDAI's control on Supervisors



- Supervisors are biometrically authenticated on the computer in which they will conduct enrolment of residents.
- The Aadhaar Enrolment Software does not allow an unauthorized Supervisor to login to the software.
- Supervisor provides biometrics on every resident packet where there is a biometric exception recorded. He provides biometric sign-off in addition to the Operator's sign-off.

Local verification status and error generated by software is depicted in below table.


Entry	Status	Permission for enrolment	Error/Warning
Supervisor	Not an authorized Supervisor on the machine	No	Cannot login to the client
Supervisor	Authorized	Yes	

- An enrolment packet will be rejected if the Operator's Biometrics in the packet does not match the authorized Supervisor's biometrics.
- The data quality of enrolment by an Operator is continuously evaluated at UIDAI's back end. UIDAI has awarded as well as blacklisted operators based on Performance Monitoring.

## 16 Training and Certification Provisions by UIDAI

- **Training & Certification Agencies:** To bring all enrolment operators to a uniform skill level, UIDAI has built standardized training content, empanelled Training Agencies that are authorized to deliver our training and appointed Sify and NSEIT as the Testing & Certification agency.
- Each candidate receives a certification number that is Unique. This number is sent by the certification agencies directly to UIDAI.
- Total number of tests conducted till date are 342143 (Data till 20<sup>th</sup> November, 2013).
- Total Number of Operators and Supervisors certified for UIDAI enrolment process are 209476 (Data till 20<sup>th</sup> November, 2013).


### UIDAI Controls for Operator & Supervisor



Thus UIDAI is engaged at each stage of Operator/Supervisor activation and also monitors Enrolment Agency and their Operator, Supervisor for every enrolment once enrolment starts. UIDAI has blacklisted about 3146 Operators and Supervisors till date based on performance.



## 17 Enrolment Centers



- Registrar identify and co-ordinate for suitable locations where Enrolment Centers may be setup keeping in mind law and order, terrain, local weather conditions, security, power availability, approach/access to the area and lighting.
- Non-state Registrars (NSR) work in coordination with UIDAI and state nodal departments. These Registrars have enrolment centers only in and around their premises to ensure close supervision. Banks working as Non-State Registrars can also be allowed to enroll through special camps provided that they have cleared these enrolment plans with the State UID Implementation Committee and/or the State Nodal officer.
- All Enrolment Center Locations information is uploaded on UIDAI website along with Contact Information.
- All Enrolment Centers are validated by Registrar or UIDAI before they reflect on UIDAI website.

## 18 Enrolment Machine

- All Enrolment Machines working in the field for Aadhaar Enrolment are registered in UIDAI.
- UIDAI has laid down specifications for the machine that the Enrolment Agency procures for Aadhaar Enrolment.
- The Enrolment Agency installs the Aadhaar software.
- The Enrolment Machines have to undergo a series of steps for registration before they become an authorized machine for enrolling residents.
  - i. Administrator should have the Registrar code provided by UIDAI.
  - ii. Administrator should have the enrolment agency code provided by UIDAI.
  - iii. Administrator should have the unique station id to be assigned to the system.
  - iv. Administrator should have the Enrolment agency specific user name and password to register the enrolment client..
  - v. The machine must be connected to UIDAI server for registration to take place.
- Some Master data files need to be imported in the machine before it starts working as an enrolment machine. These master data files are controlled by managed and controlled by UIDAI like:
  - i. User credentials file that has list of all active Operators, Supervisor and Introducers that can be on-boarded on the machine.
  - ii. Pin code master data that has Pincodes and corresponding data of State, District, Post office etc used in data entry of resident's address.
- The make and model of biometric devices that can be used for enrolment are also controlled through software by UIDAI.
- The packets that have been received and processed at UIDAI are marked for deletion from the Enrolment machine in the field. This is done when the client machine at field connects with UIDAI server for synching.
- Apart from this the Aadhaar client software has provision to freeze in case of certain anomalies like machine not synched (machine not connected to UIDAI server) in more than 10 days, packets pending for upload is more than 1000 or packets are not uploaded within 20 days of enrolment.


### 18.1 Device Certification

**Device Certification Agency:** To support Registrars in deploying the right devices for the enrolment process, UIDAI has appointed STQC (Standardization, Testing & Quality Certification) as the device certification agency. STQC will certify biometric devices (Fingerprint Scanner & Iris Camera) by make & model.

An Enrolment Agency uses only UIDAI certified Biometric Devices during enrolment. Any enrolment done by uncertified devices is not possible through Aadhaar Enrolment software.

## UIDAI Controls for Enrolment Machine


## Registration Activities for an Enrolment Machine




Authorized Enrolment Machine

Registered Aadhaar Enrolment Machine


Machine will be automatically locked for Aadhaar Enrolment or will not permit the following



Blacklisted Operator or Supervisor cannot enroll Residents



Machine not synced with the server in last 10 days



Enrolment packets not upload within 20 days of enrolment or packets pending for upload count exceeds 1000



Uncertified Devices




Un-Authorized Software version



Old Master Data Version


Data Inputs Controlled by UIDAI




Pin code File



Certified Biometric Devices that can be used



Authorized and Blacklisted users (Operators, Supervisors, Introducers)



Flagging and deletion of Enrolment Packets that are received at UIDAI and can be removed from the client



## 19 Enrolment Process

### 19.1 Enrolment Process and Encryption

- Resident needs to fill up the Aadhaar Enrolment Form as per the instructions provided in the form. Resident needs to get the demographic data provided by him/her verified. Resident must carry Original proof documents for verification. At a high level the verification of 'Personal Details' and the 'Address Details' are mandatory, whereas the 'Parent/Guardian', 'Introducer' and 'Contact' details are optional or conditional. The acceptable verification procedures are :
  - i. For Verification based on Documents, the Registrar's Verifier present at the Enrolment Centre will verify the documents against the form details. It is mandatory for the Verifier to be available at the centre during the operational hours of the centre.
  - ii. For residents who do not have documentary proofs for Identity and address can use the Introducer based verification for Aadhaar Enrolment who endorses known residents and ensures that their given particulars are correct. Any false verification by Introducer shall make him liable for legal action. Introducer's name and UID is entered during resident enrolment. The Introducer must provide his/her UID and signature/thumbprint on the Form of the resident. Same is entered in the Aadhaar software and becomes a part of the Resident packet.
  - iii. National Population Register process of public scrutiny.
- The Operator enters the verified demographic details in the enrolment software. The software has built-in features to ensure completion of mandatory data fields. Demographic and Biometric data is captured. Mandatory Demographic data consists of Name, Address, Date of Birth/Age and Gender. Biometric data includes Face photo, all ten fingerprints and both Iris.
- Resident's eyes and fingers are checked for fitness (missing/amputated). If the resident has any deformities due to which it is not possible to take fingerprints/iris, these also have to be recorded as a biometric exception.
- In case of children below the age of 5 years one of the parents' or guardian's name is recorded and UID or Enrolment ID (either of the two numbers) is recorded. This is mandatory. Children's biometrics are not captured.
- Resident's consent for information sharing is asked for in the enrolment form and captured in software accordingly. Information sharing consent checks whether it is alright with the resident if the information captured is shared with organisations engaged in delivery of welfare services.
- Another information asked in the enrolment form is if resident wants to participate in the scheme of financial inclusion (FI) and same is entered in the client accordingly. Resident can do so either by linking his current Bank account to his Aadhaar Number or by giving his/her consent that he/she has no objection in sharing his/her information for the purpose of opening a new Bank/ Post Office account linked to his Aadhaar number.
- All the data captured is reviewed with the resident before finally completing the enrolment.
- The Operator then provides own Fingerprint to sign-off the data captured of the resident.
- In case of any Biometric exceptions recorded for the resident, the Supervisor screen gets activated for sign off. The Supervisor will sign off any biometric exceptions observed in Resident Data Collection by providing own fingerprint.
- In case the verification type is selected as Introducer then the Introducer has to provide biometric sign off on the review screen.
- Print receipt is printed which consists of Acknowledgement and Consent for Enrolment. Operator signs and provides Acknowledgement to the resident. Resident signs the consent which is handed




over by the EA to UIDAI along with other resident documents. We have covered management of documents by UIDAI in another section that will follow.

- Once enrolment is complete, the enrolment file of the resident is stored in an encrypted format. No one can open or tamper the file. The files contents can be only read by the UIDAI.

#### UIDAI Enrolment Process

##### Aadhaar Enrolment Software Controls




#### 19.2 Packet Upload

- The Enrolment Packets are uploaded on UIDAI server only by using a custom client for secure file transfer protocol (SFTP).
- Each upload station /client needs to be registered at the UIDAI server.
- All upload client users are created at server level. Therefore only authorized Enrolment Agency personnel can use this client for file transfer.
- The client has two level of Access Control
  - i. User ID
  - ii. One Time Password (OTP) sent on the user's registered mobile.
- The IP of the client machine should be within the series allocation for India region.
- The following controls are also implemented at the enrollment packet level.
  - i. It should have been created by UID registered client and the machine should have been synched with UID server.
  - ii. The packet size is checked against the packet size reported at the time of synch.
  - iii. No enrollment packet can be uploaded more than once unless it is required by UIDAI

## 20 Letter Print and Delivery


- UIDAI uses the services of 3<sup>rd</sup> party printers for Letter printing and Letters are delivered using the services of India Post.
- Printing is done at three locations listed below:
  - i. Mumbai, Maharashtra
  - ii. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh
  - iii. Manipal, Karnataka
- Printing is done in 11 Local Languages namely :
  - i. Bengali
  - ii. Gujarati
  - iii. Hindi
  - iv. Kannada
  - v. Malayalam
  - vi. Marathi
  - vii. Oriya
  - viii. Punjabi
  - ix. Tamil
  - x. Telugu
  - xi. English
- Printing will start in 3 more languages viz. Urdu, Assamese and Manipuri.
- Present per day letter dispatch is between 13 – 15 Lakhs. UIDAI has printed and dispatched more than 44 crores letters till date.
- Letters not delivered to Resident are returned to UIDAI P.O. Box 1947, Bangalore. Return letter status shall be shortly available on UIDAI website.

Aadhaar Letter Printing and Delivery Process Overview



## 21 Contact Center

- The UIDAI has setup a Contact Centre (Aadhaar Sampark Kendra) to manage all queries and grievances and serve as a single point of contact for the organization.
- Current Contact Centre firm is Tata Business Support Services (TBSS) which commenced operations on 12th February 2013. It is operating from three locations namely, Pune, Hyderabad and Jamshedpur.
- Support Channels available are :
  - i. Phone: 1800 300 1947 ; Short Code : 1947
  - ii. E-Mail: help@uidai.gov.in
- Support Window :
  - 7 AM to 11 PM - Monday to Saturday.
  - 8 AM to 5 PM - Sunday.
  - Services are not available on National Holidays.
- The Languages that Aadhaar Sampark Kendra is currently supporting are:
  - i. Hindi
  - ii. Kannada
  - iii. Marathi
  - iv. English
  - v. Telugu
  - vi. Bengali
- Additional languages will be supported in future.
- At present approximately 220 agents work during peak time.
- The Aadhaar Contact Center is receiving approximately 1,25,000 calls and 2500 e-mails on a daily basis.





## 22 Monitoring Mechanism


### 22.1 Enrolment Centers Monitoring

- UIDAI has limited staff and Registrars also have a challenge in providing sufficient manpower required for monitoring role. Thus, in order to expand outreach and availability of monitors, UIDAI out rolled a scheme for engaging performance monitors from amongst the Retired Personnel of Central/State Government and Defense Services of Gazetted level / Retired Manager level and above from Public Sector Undertakings and Public Sector Banks. UIDAI looks for socially committed people who are willing to render their services as Monitors to this nation building project.
- The monitoring is for adherence to guidelines of processes, manpower and infrastructure deployed at centre.
- These Monitors must physically audit minimum 20% of active centres in the field every month for each Registrar-EA combination. The monitors use UIDAI approved process documents, checklists and guidelines for performance monitoring at enrolment centers.
- Monitors reports are updated on the UIDAI's Performance Monitoring Portal.
- UIDAI Regional Offices hold meetings periodically with the Monitors in order to review the findings of the inspection.
- Regional Offices evaluate portal reports from Monitors, analyze Enrolment Agency performance and communicate required corrective Actions, process and technology changes, skill gaps and training needs.

### 22.2 Quality Checks

Till Now we have talked about various validations and checks prior to and during enrolment process. The entire end to end checks and validations are depicted in the picture below:

Stages of Quality Checks and Validations during Enrolment



We will now discuss the Quality checks on the enrolment packet once the packet reaches UIDAI which are as follows:

- The enrollments are also subjected to demographic duplication checks to filter multiple enrollments by same resident.
- All packets with bio-metric exception enrollments undergo compulsory manual verification of the exception photograph with the exception highlighted.




- Each packet undergoes automatic validation checks for example:
  - i. Name that has less than three characters
  - ii. Difference in the number of words in English and local language in any field
  - iii. Packet that is marked for bad quality photograph by the Aadhaar Enrolment Software
- Enrollment failing automatic validation checks mandatorily undergoes manual check for demographic errors.
- The enrollments are checked manually , on sampling basis, for demographic errors on the following parameters:
  - i. gender photo mismatch
  - ii. age photo mismatch
  - iii. bad quality photograph
  - iv. error in name /address
  - v. name address transliteration error
  - vi. incomplete address
- All enrollments in the age group of less than 5 and more than 80 mandatorily undergo above demographic check.
- The sampling policy is as follows :
  - i. All enrolments by a new operator are checked uptill a threshold number of packets - currently the number is 385.
  - ii. Post check the operator is assigned a Red, Orange or Green category based on the error rate.
  - iii. Based on the Operator category a particular percentage of the enrollment of such operators is picked for sample check on daily basis. The rest of the packets are passed.
- This sampling is done after all the automatic validations and the compulsory check are done on the enrollment packet.

### 22.3 Biometric De-duplication to establish uniqueness of resident

- All Resident Enrolment Packets undergo Biometric De-duplication. Biometric de-duplication is the process where the individual resident's biometric data (finger prints and Iris) is compared with the biometric data of all the other residents enrolled in Aadhaar to establish a resident as unique while rejecting duplicates.
- An Aadhaar is generated for those residents where no duplicate records are found for the resident.
- In case a duplicate record is found for a resident packet in Aadhaar database, the enrolment packet is rejected.
- The checks and validations on an enrolment packet after it is uploaded are depicted in the below picture.

# Quality and Validation Checks on Enrolment Packets after enrolment packet is uploaded



### 23 Document Management System

UIDAI collects physical document copies from residents for verification of address, identity and date of birth. Other two documents are resident's consent and verified enrolment form.

UIDAI has developed a Document Management System (DMS) and has engaged Hewlett Packard (HP) as a service provider for these services. Document Management ensures all the sensitive documents pertaining to residents are kept in a secured environment and maintained by UIDAI for any future retrieval.


The proposed infrastructure called the "Aadhaar Document Management System" for UIDAI has following features:

- Physical storage of Aadhaar enrolment forms and accompanying documents produced and collected during enrollment process.
- Scanning & conversion of physical forms and documents into digital/electronic formats and proper storage supported by state of the art Document Management System.
- Easy, convenient, safe & secure retrieval of original forms & documents when needed.

## 24 UIDAI List of IT Tools and Portals

### 24.1 UIDAI Website

- The URL is : <http://uidai.gov.in/>
- This website is an Information Portal for all Ecosystem Partners. It has rich repository of Enrollment Process & Guidelines Documents, Technical Documents, Memorandum of Understanding with all Registrars, List of Empanelled Enrolment Agencies, latest News items on Aadhaar, Information on all UIDAI tenders, Contact Information and links to other portals.
- This website has a dedicated section for Residents. The resident portal snapshot is shown below:




- The Resident Portal facilitates residents for locating operational Enrolment Centers in and around their areas, in booking appointments for enrolment, in checking their Aadhaar status and to download e-Aadhaar.

### 24.2 Aadhaar Admin Portal

- URL: [portal.uidai.gov.in](http://portal.uidai.gov.in)
- This portal has live analytics data like Aadhaar Numbers generated till date.
- This portal is information and transaction Portal for Registrars and Enrolment Agencies to manage operations.
- Registrars use this portal for :
  - i. Managing Organization Details; Name and Primary Contact of Registrar.
  - ii. Associate Enrolment Agencies; Registrar Enrolment Agency mapping specific to Registrar.
  - iii. Registration of Introducers in UID and defining their administrative boundaries (State/District).
  - iv. To get Enrolment Agency Performance Reports.
  - v. UIDAI Master Data Download like for Pin code, Post Office & Bank.



- Enrolment Agency use this portal for :
  - Addition and Activation of Operators and Supervisors
  - Deactivation of Operators and Supervisors
  - To get Enrolment Agency Performance Reports.
  - Master Data Download like Pin code, Bank, valid Introducers and active/blacklisted Operator & Supervisor, valid Proof Documents.
- A snapshot of Aadhaar admin portal is shown below:



#### 24.3 EA Performance Monitoring Portal

- After Enrolment Agency field centre monitoring, the performance sheets and scores are entered in Enrolment Agency Performance Monitoring Portal.
- URL : <http://qamis.uidai.gov.in/pms/Login.aspx>

#### 24.4 Operator/Supervisor Certification Portal

- URLS: Sify - <http://uidai.sifytest.com>  
NSE.IT- [http://uidai.nseitexams.com/UIDAI/LoginAction\\_input.action](http://uidai.nseitexams.com/UIDAI/LoginAction_input.action)
- These portals are used by Enrolment Agency staff to register and apply for test to get certification in Aadhaar Enrolment process.
- This portal has List of all successful candidates.
- List of certified candidates is shared with UIDAI. Successful Certification is one of the mandatory requirements to be eligible to work as Aadhaar enrollers in field.

#### 24.5 Aadhaar SFTP Client for packet Upload

- The upload of resident packets is possible through the custom client developed by UIDAI only. This client provides a secure and faster way for transferring packets. It provides real time reports.
- This SFTP Client is downloaded from URL: [upload.uidai.gov.in](http://upload.uidai.gov.in)

## 25 Data Center Security

- UIDAI datacenters have state of the art firewall and intrusion prevention systems.
- UIDAI regularly conducts security audits of its data centre.
- Data is partitioned across multiple security "zones" separated by firewall and intrusion prevention.
- The encrypted packets are decrypted using the UIDAI private keys which are stored in hardware security modules (HSM). No individual and only authorized software program can access the resident data in the packet.
- Data and systems access is audited and controlled.
- UIDAI takes special care to protect the biometric data of the residents. Resident's Biometrics Data is always stored encrypted even inside UIDAI data centre.
  - i. Biometric de-duplication is the process where the individual resident's biometric data (finger prints and Iris) is compared with the biometric data of all the other residents enrolled in Aadhaar to establish a resident as unique while rejecting duplicates. Biometric Service Providers perform this process of biometric de-duplication.
  - ii. Biometric de-duplication software is hosted in a secure zone inside the UIDAI data centre.
  - iii. All Data is also hosted within the UIDAI data center only, and has no connectivity to the external world.
  - iv. The Biometric Service provider gets only an internal reference ID when the biometrics are shared with them. The service providers do not get any personal identification information (PII). The resident information is not passed to them. Therefore, they cannot establish a link between a resident's demographic and biometric information.
  - v. Biometric service providers cannot store raw biometric image ever. It is only available with UIDAI.

## 26 Aadhaar Enrolment Fact Sheet

No.	Metric	Count
1.	Number of Enrolment packets uploaded (Non-RGI)	450,094,976
2.	Number of Enrolment packets uploaded (RGI)	167,168,494
3.	Number of Aadhaar Generated (Non- RGI)	394,927,490
4.	Number of Aadhaar Generated (RGI)	114,167,141
5.	Number of Active Registrars (that have done enrolment in 2nd phase starting 1 <sup>st</sup> April, 2012)	51
6.	Number of Enrolment Active Agencies (that have done enrolment in 2nd phase starting 1 <sup>st</sup> April, 2012)	163
7.	Number of Introducers registered in UIDAI database	3700
8.	Number of Aadhaar generated for Introducers based enrolment	187584
9.	Number of Active Operators	68990
10.	Number of Active Supervisors	82613
11.	Number of Operators and Supervisors blacklisted by UIDAI	1523
12.	Number of empanelled Training Agencies	14
13.	Average Number of stations operating in the field in last six months	21000
14.	Number of Aadhaar Letters Printed	44,300,000
15.	Number of complaints dealt with by the Aadhaar Contact Center daily	1,25,000 calls and 2500 emails
16.	Number of documents collected in document management system	210,000,000